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I n response to a conflict among the circuits, the 
United States Supreme Court, in 
Medtronic v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240 
(1996), addressed federal pre-
emption of state tort suits for Class 
III medical devices under the 
Medical Device Amendments of 
1976. The Court, in an opinion by 
Justice Stevens, held that the 
Medical Device Amendments did 
not pre-empt state negligent design 
claims in product liability suits for 
defective Class III medical de-
vices, negligent manufacture or 
labeling claims, and common-law 
requirements that are substantial 
equivalents of requirements under 
federal law. With this decision, 
the Court effectively eliminated 
federal pre-emption of Class III 
medical device products liability 
cases, opening the door for 
numerous state lawsuits. More-
over, although the application of 
pre-emption principles to the Med-
ical Device Amendments is clear 
after Medtronic, the division of the 
Court in the case suggests that the 
scope of federal pre-emption of 
common-law claims in other con-
texts is far from resolved. 
In an attempt to alleviate pub-
lic apprehension regarding medical 
devices in the early 1970s, Con-
gress passed the Medical Device 
Amendments Act of 1976 
("MDA"). The MDA grouped 
these devices into three classes. 
Since Class III devices were 
deemed to pose the most potential 
danger to the public, they had to 
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meet the most stringent require-
ments in order to receive approval 
from the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration ("FDA"). The FDA re-
quired Class III devices to pass a 
strict "premarket approval" 
("PMA") to insure the device's 
safety and effectiveness. Con-
gress, however, created two excep-
tions to the PMA requirement be-
cause of the sheer number of al-
ready existing devices and the time 
involved in the FDA approval pro-
cess. Those exceptions allowed 
any pre-1976 Class III device or 
substantial equivalent to be sold 
with far less burdensome require-
ments until the FDA could rule on 
the PMA. 
In October of 1982, Medtronic, 
a manufacturer of medical devices, 
notified the FDA that it planned to 
sell the Model 4011 pacemaker 
lead, a part of the pacemaker that 
transmits electric impulses to the 
heart. Pursuant to the "substantial 
equivalent" exception created by 
the MDA, the FDA granted temp-
orary approval of the device, al-
lowing Medtronic to put the pace-
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makers with the Model 4011 leads 
on the market. In 1987, Lora Lohr 
("Lohr") received a pacemaker 
with the Medtronic lead to regulate 
her heartbeat. When the pace-
maker lead failed several years 
later, Mrs. Lohr suffered injury to 
her heart that resulted in emer-
gency surgery. 
The Lohrs then sued Medtronic 
for negligence and strict liability in 
Florida state court in 1993. The 
case was removed to federal dis-
trict court on Medtronic' s motion 
where the district court found their 
state law claims pre-empted and 
dismissed the Lohrs' complaint. 
On appeal, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
reversed in part and affirmed in 
part, holding that the negligent 
design claims were not pre-
empted, but the negligent manu-
facturing and failure to warn 
claims were pre-empted by FDA 
regulations. The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to resolve the 
pre-emption issue. 
The Court began by discussing 
two general principles about fed-
eral pre-emption. First, in defer-
ence to the boundaries of federal-
ism, the Court emphasized that a 
state law based on its police power 
would not be pre-empted unless it 
was the "clear and manifest pur-
pose of Congress." Medtronic, 
116 S. Ct. at 2250. Second, the 
Court underscored the importance 
of discerning congressional pur-
pose in the particular context of a 
pre-emption case, to determine the 
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existence and scope of federal pre-
emption. Id To ascertain con-
gressional intent, the Court stated 
that it must analyze not only the 
statutory language of the pre-
emption statute itself, but must 
also consider the pre-emption lan-
guage within the framework of the 
entire statute. Id at 2250-51. 
Speaking for only a plurality of 
four justices, Justice Stevens dis-
cussed the issue of whether 21 
U.S.C. § 360k(a) pre-empted all 
common-law claims. The plurality 
based its reasoning on statutory 
language, legislative history, and 
in particular, the purpose of the 
statute. Id at 2251-53. Section 
360k(a) states in pertinent part: 
[N]o State ... may estab-
lish or continue in effect 
with respect to a [medical] 
device intended for human 
use any requirement (1) 
which is different from, or 
in addition to, any require-
ment applicable under this 
chapter to the device, and 
(2) which relates to the 
safety or effectiveness of 
the device or to any other 
matter included in a re-
quirement applicable to the 
device under this chapter. 
Id at 2248-49. The plurality re-
jected Medtronic's blanket asser-
tion that any state common-law 
claim would qualify as a "require-
ment . . . different from, or in 
addition to" existing FDA regula-
tions for purposes of pre-emption 
under the statute. Id at 2251. The 
plurality found Medtronic' s 
position particularly unconvincing 
because it effectively would have 
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deprived a plaintiff injured by a 
medical device of any remedy. Id 
Federal pre-emption would not 
permit relief for the injured party 
under state tort law, and federal 
law would not grant relief because 
the MDA has no provision for a 
private cause of action. ld Con-
gress, the plurality reasoned, could 
not have intended such an unjust 
result when, ostensibly, the pur-
pose of the statute was to protect 
consumers from defective medical 
devices. Id. 
The plurality referred to inter-
pretations of the term "require-
ments" in other contexts as support 
for its conclusion that the "re-
quirements" in § 360k(a) did not 
encompass all common-law 
claims. The plurality distinguish-
ed the Court's previous holding in 
Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 
505 U.S. 504 (1992) that a "statute 
pre-empting certain state 'require-
ments' could also pre-empt 
common-law damages claims," 
stressing that the interpretation of 
requirements in the statute in that 
case did not preclude all common-
law claims. Medtronic at 2251. In 
contrast, in this case, the effects of 
adopting Medtronic's interpreta-
tion of the statute would result in 
exclusion of all common-law 
claims. Id. 
Justice Breyer added a fifth 
vote and joined the opinion of the 
Court in discussing the specific 
question of whether the Lohrs' 
common-law claims were pre-
empted. Id at 2254. The Court 
addressed Medtronic' s argument 
that an FDA substantial equivalent 
determination for the pacemaker 
lead constituted a "requirement" 
that pre-empted the Lohrs' negli-
gent design claim. Id In holding 
that a substantial equivalent deter-
mination was not a "requirement" 
that pre-empted the negligent de-
sign claim, the Court reasoned that 
the determination did not amount 
to FDA approval because the lead 
was still required to pass the even-
tual premarket approval for Class 
III medical devices. Id Nor did a 
substantial equivalent classifica-
tion provide any protection to the 
public. Instead, by requiring 
Medtronic to follow "good manu-
facturing practices," and to list and 
label such devices, the classifica-
tion merely allowed Medtronic to 
compete with exempt pre-1976 
medical devices. Id 
Next, the Court reached the 
Lohrs' identity of requirements 
claims. Id at 2255. Although § 
360k pre-empts state causes of 
action that create additional "re-
quirements" from FDA regula-
tions, the Court was unwilling to 
find that a damages action seeking 
to enforce an FDA regulation was 
an additional requirement. Id In 
order to be pre-empted, the Court 
noted that there must be state law 
claims that are "different from or 
in addition to" the FDA require-
ments. Id Unlike federal law, 
Florida law requires negligence to 
be proven to recover damages in 
labeling or manufacturing claims. 
Id The Court, however, stated 
that this requirement, while techni-
cally different from the FDA, was 
insufficient to trigger pre-emption. 
Id In the Court's view, state re-
quirements that made it more diffi-
cult for a plaintiff to recover dam-
ages were not pre-empted by § 
360k. Id. As a further justification 
for its conclusion, the Court em-
phasized that in determining the 
scope of pre-emption, courts must 
look to FDA regulations. Id. Here, 
the Court stated that FDA regula-
tions supported the Lohrs' posi-
tion. Id. at 2256. 
Next, the Court noted that the 
FDA did promulgate federal re-
quirements for the labeling and 
manufacture of medical devices, 
and the Court acknowledged that 
these regulations constituted re-
quirements. Id. Nevertheless, the 
Court considered the general na-
ture of the regulations insufficient 
to pre-empt state common-law 
claims in this case. Id. Section 
360k(a)(1) requires that the federal 
requirement must be "applicable to 
the device," and under FDA regu-
lations, "preempt state law only if 
they are specific counterpart regu-
lations or specific to a particular 
device." Id. at 2257. In this case, 
the Court, after comparing the 
state and federal requirements, 
held that the manufacturing and 
labeling claims were not pre-
empted because common-law tort 
actions were not developed specif-
ically "with respect to" medical 
devices. Id. at 2258. 
Finally, the Court refused to 
respond to the Lohrs' assertion that 
§ 360k never pre-empts common-
law claims. Id. at 2258. The 
Court concluded that it was unnec-
essary to reach this issue because 
none of the claims in the case had 
been pre-empted. Id. at 2259. The 
Court stated in dicta, however, that 
it would be "rare indeed" to find 
pre-emption of common-law 
claims under the statute. Id. 
Justice Breyer's concurring 
opinion stressed that the MDA 
could sometimes pre-empt a state 
law tort suit. Id. As support, Jus-
tice Breyer cited the Court's deci-
sion in Cipollone. Id. He rejected 
the plurality's distinctions between 
the meaning of "requirements" in 
the context of § 360k and the 
meaning of requirements in the 
Cipollone statute. Id. at 2262. 
Justice O'Connor concurred in 
part and dissented in part. She 
concluded that state common-law 
causes of action were "require-
ments" under the statute and would 
therefore be pre-empted where 
such requirements differed from 
the MDA. Id. Although Justice 
O'Connor agreed that the negli-
gent design claims and violation of 
federal requirements claims were 
not pre-empted, she argued that the 
labeling and manufacturing claims 
should have been pre-empted be-
cause they created requirements 
"different from and in addition to" 
the federal requirements. Jd. at 
2264. 
In Medtronic v. Lohr, the 
Supreme Court gave control of 
common-law product liability law-
suits for defective medical devices 
back to the States, and effectively 
eliminated one of the only de-
fenses left for medical device man-
ufacturers. If the cost of defending 
these actions becomes prohi-
bitively high, the practical result 
may be a halt in the advances in 
technology for medical devices. 
Additionally, the differing opin-
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ions of the Supreme Court in this 
case raise the question of when, if 
ever, common-law claims will be 
pre-empted in the future. 
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